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Abstract—We propose an extension to the so-called PD de-
tector. The PD detector jointly monitors received power and
correlation profile distortion to detect the presence of GNSS
carry-off-type spoofing, jamming, or multipath. We show that
classification performance can be significantly improved by re-
placing the PD detector’s symmetric-difference-based distortion
measurement with one based on the post-fit residuals of the
maximum-likelihood estimate of a single-signal correlation func-
tion model. We call the improved technique the PD-ML detector.
In direct comparison with the PD detector, the PD-ML detector
exhibits improved classification accuracy when tested against an
extensive library of recorded field data. In particular, it is (1)
significantly more accurate at distinguishing a spoofing attack
from a jamming attack, (2) better at distinguishing multipath-
afflicted data from interference-free data, and (3) less likely to
issue a false alarm by classifying multipath as spoofing. The PD-
ML detector achieves this improved performance at the expense
of additional computational complexity.
Index Terms—satellite navigation systems, Global Positioning
System, navigation security, GNSS spoofing, GNSS jamming,
GNSS authentication
I. INTRODUCTION
C
IVIL GNSS receivers are susceptible to counterfeit
spoofing signals [1]–[4]. To defend against spoofing
attacks, several algorithms have been developed and reported
in the literature. A comprehensive review of GNSS spoof-
ing detection methods is provided in [5], where methods
are broadly categorized as (1) cryptographic techniques, (2)
geometric techniques that exploit angle-of-arrival diversity, or
(3) signal processing techniques that do not fall into categories
(1) or (2), such as the PD detector [6].
Within the latter category, the subset of techniques which do
not require additional hardware and can be implemented via
a firmware update are particularly attractive for widespread
adoption. Of these, the PD detector, which jointly monitors
received power and correlation profile distortion, has been
shown to reliably alarm in the presence of carry-off-type
spoofing or jamming attacks while maintaining a low multi-
channel false alarm rate, when tested against 27 high quality
data recordings [6].
An appealing attribute of the PD detector is simplicity: its
received power and correlation profile distortion measurements
are computationally lightweight and amenable to analysis.
However, when tested in [6] against an extensive set of em-
pirical data, the PD detector was shown to incorrectly classify
most instances of spoofing as jamming, and its 0.57% single-
channel false alarm rate (false declaration of interference-
free or multipath-afflicted signals as spoofing or jamming),
is too high for some applications of practical interest. This
correspondence article extends the PD detector to address
these shortcomings, and for compactness, it is intended to be
read alongside the original PD detector paper [6].
The PD detector’s shortcomings stem from two undesirable
features of the symmetric difference (SD) as a measure of
distortion. First, the standard SD involves only a pair of com-
plex correlation function taps and is not particularly sensitive
to correlation function distortion not aligned with these taps.
Thus, if the SD taps are closely spaced around the prompt
correlation tap, then the SD can be a good distortion measure
during the initial stage of a carry-off-type spoofing attack, but
quickly becomes insensitive as the attack proceeds. Second,
the SD depends on the receiver’s code tracking loop to align its
pair of taps symmetrically about the authentic correlation peak.
But even in the absence of spoofing or significant multipath,
thermal noise prevents the code tracking loop from achieving
perfectly symmetric alignment. As a consequence, the SD
tends to exaggerate the actual distortion under the null (thermal
noise only) and jamming hypotheses.
The PD-ML detector’s distortion measure avoids both of
these limitations. It begins by measuring the correlation func-
tion at many more than two taps, which offers two advantages:
(1) the PD-ML detector can be made sensitive to distortion
far from the prompt tap, thus extending the range of spoofing-
to-authentic code offsets over which it can detect spoofing,
and (2) the PD-ML detector’s measure of distortion can be
made independent of the receiver’s code and carrier tracking
loops in the sense that small tracking errors in no way
affect the reported distortion. This is done by exploiting data
from the additional taps to obtain the maximum-likelihood
estimates of the amplitude, code phase, and carrier phase of the
correlation peak in a single-signal correlation function model.
After removing this estimated correlation function model from
each of the correlation taps, the PD-ML detector takes as its
distortion measure the squared magnitude of the normalized
post-fit residuals. As will be shown, distortion measured in
this way permits more accurate classification of jamming,
multipath, and spoofing than distortion based on a simple
symmetric difference.
Herein, we adopt, without alteration, several aspects of the
PD detector [6]. In particular, the signal models (Section II
of [6]), probability distributions (Section III of [6]), and the
Monte-Carlo-type Bayes-optimal decision rule design strategy
developed (Section VI of [6]). This correspondence, a signifi-
cant extension of our conference paper [7], exploits multi-tap
maximum-likelihood multipath estimation and demonstrates
the proposed PD-ML detector’s advantages through a direct
comparison with the original PD detector on the same ex-
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perimental data recordings and using the same Bayes-optimal
detector design strategy as presented in [6]. Details of the PD-
ML detector are presented in Section III, followed by simu-
lated (Section IV) and experimental (Section VI) evaluation
of its classification performance. All source code required to
generate decision rules using the PD-ML detector is publicly
available at https://github.com/navSecurity/P-D-defense.
II. SIGNAL MODELS
For a thorough discussion of the GNSS signal models
adopted in this work, starting with the pre–correlation sig-
nal model, the reader is directed to the paper on the PD
detector [6]. However, to provide the context necessary to
understand this paper’s proposed extension to the PD detector,
a brief review of the single-interferer post-correlation model
assumed in [6], which is adapted from [8], is presented
here. This model gives the complex-valued receiver correlation
function at some arbitrary code offset, or lag, τ , as
ξk(τ) = βk[ξAk(τ) + ξIk(τ) + ξNk(τ)] (1)
where βk is the average value of the automatic gain control
scaling factor over the kth accumulation interval, and ξAk(τ),
ξIk(τ), ξNk(τ) are the complex correlation function compo-
nents corresponding to the authentic signal, the interference
signal, and thermal noise, respectively.
Just as in [6], the correlation components for the authentic
and interference signal, ξAk(τ) and ξIk(τ), are assumed to be
modeled as
ξAk(τ) =
√
PAkR(−∆τAk + τ) exp(j∆θAk)
ξIk(τ) =
√
ηkPAkR(−∆τIk + τ) exp(j∆θIk)
where R(τ) is the GNSS auto-correlation function, and, at
the kth accumulation interval, PAk is the average value of
the authentic signal’s power, ηk is the average interference
signal’s power advantage over the authentic signal (i.e., ηk =
PIk/PAk), and ∆τAk is the average value of the code offset
τA − τˆ , with τA being the true code phase of the authentic
signal and τˆ being the receiver’s estimate of the same. Similar
definitions follow for ∆τIk , ∆θAk, and ∆θIk [6].
The thermal noise component of the correlation function,
ξNk(τ), is modeled as having independent in-phase (real) and
quadrature (imaginary) components, each modeled as a zero-
mean Gaussian white discrete-time process:
E[R{ξNk(ρ)}I{ξNj(ν)}] = 0 ∀ ρ, ν, k 6= j
As discussed in [9], thermal noise is correlated in the lag
domain. For samples within 2τc of each other, where τc is
the chip-width of the GNSS signal, correlation in ξNk(τ) is
modeled as
E[ξNk(ρ)ξ
∗
Nk(ν)] =
{
2σ2
N
(1− |ρ− ν|/τc) |ρ− ν| ≤ 2τc
0 |ρ− ν| > 2τc
Here, ∗ denotes the complex conjugate and σ2
N
is the variance
of the in-phase and quadrature components of ξNk(τ), which
is related to the spectral density of a white noise process that is
modeled as the sum of two independent components associated
with thermal noise and multi-access noise. The spectral density
of the thermal noise, N0, is assumed to be constant whereas
the spectral density of the multi-access noise, M0, is assumed
to be variable, as detailed in [6]. When averaging over an
accumulation interval T the variance is given as σ2
N
= (N0 +
M0)/2T .
III. MEASUREMENT MODELS
Like the PD detector, the PD-ML detector simultaneously
monitors received power and correlation function distortion.
Its received power monitor is identical to the PD detector’s, as
described in [6], but its distortion monitor differs considerably.
This section develops the measurement model for the PD-ML
detector’s distortion monitor.
The PD-ML detector models the in-phase and quadrature
(IQ) samples of the correlation function ξk as a function of
only the authentic signal and thermal noise, neglecting ξIk in
(1). It employs a maximum-likelihood estimator to estimate the
authentic signal’s amplitude, code phase, and carrier phase,
and takes the squared magnitude of the normalized post-fit
residuals as its measure of correlation profile distortion.
Maximum-likelihood estimation based on GNSS correla-
tion data is well-established in the literature [10]–[14]. It is
routinely employed within high-end GNSS receivers for mul-
tipath mitigation. This paper’s distortion monitor adapts the
particular maximum-likelihood estimator developed in [14],
as described subsequently, though other approaches could be
adopted in the PD-ML detector in a straight-forward manner.
A. Multi–Tap Maximum–Likelihood Correlation Function Es-
timator
Let l be the number of signal taps devoted to maximum-
likelihood estimation. For convenience, we assume that l is
odd and that taps are distributed, so the centermost tap is
approximately aligned with the receiver’s estimated correlation
function peak and the remaining taps are spaced evenly across
the range ±τc. The uniform tap interval is
∆δ =
2τc
(l − 1)
and the l × 1 vector of tap locations is given by
δ =
[
−τc,−τc +∆δ, . . . , τc −∆δ, τc
]T
with δi = −τc + (i − 1)∆δ representing the ith tap location,
i = 1, . . . , l.
Modeling the correlation function ξk(τ) as interference-free
(i.e., ξIk(τ) = 0 for all τ ), the complex-valued ith tap at time
index k is expressed in terms of the authentic signal’s gain-
controlled amplitude aAk, carrier phase φAk, and code phase
τAk as
ξk(δi) = βk[ξAk(δi) + ξNk(δi)]
= aAk exp(jφAk)R(δi − τAk) + βkξNk(δi) (2)
The parameters {aAk, τAk, φAk} are estimated according to
this model by an adaptation of the maximum likelihood
technique in [14]. This approach separates estimation of the
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code phase from estimation of amplitude and carrier phase by
exploiting the linear relationship
ξk = H(τAk, δ)aAk exp(jφAk) (3)
where ξk = [ξk(δ1), . . . , ξk(δl)]
T and the observation matrix
H(τAk, δ) is
H(τAk, δ) =


R(δ1 − τAk)
...
R(δl − τAk)

 (4)
First, a coarse search is performed by setting the code phase
estimate τˆAk = δi for i = 1, . . . , l and, for each candi-
date τˆAk, solving for the maximum-likelihood estimate of
aAk exp(jφAk):
aˆAk exp(jφˆAk) =[
HT (τˆAk, δ)Q
−1H(τˆAk, δ)
]
−1
HT (τˆAk, δ)Q
−1ξk (5)
where Q is the l × l Toeplitz matrix that accounts for the
correlation of the complex Gaussian thermal noise among the
taps [14]. The (a, b)th element of Q is Qa,b = R(|a− b|∆δ),
where ∆δ is the tap spacing.
The cost Jk corresponding to each set of estimates
{aˆAk, τˆAk, φˆAk}, is calculated as
Jk =
∥∥∥ξk −H(τˆAk, δ)aˆAk exp(jφˆAk)
∥∥∥2
Q
(6)
where the norm is defined such that ‖x‖2Q = x
TQ−1x.
The two sets of estimates yielding the smallest cost Jk are
extracted. Because the cost Jk is proportional to the negative
log likelihood function, the set with the minimum cost is the
maximum likelihood estimate.
In a second step, a refined code phase estimate is obtained
by a bisecting search between the two lowest-cost code phase
estimates. At each bisection point, new amplitude and carrier
phase estimates are determined by re-evaluating (5). The
process is repeated until Jk is no longer significantly reduced.
Upon convergence, the resulting estimates are accepted as
the maximum-likelihood estimates {aˆAk, τˆAk, φˆAk}, and the
corresponding Jk is taken as the distortion measurement Dk.
A small Jk indicates that the single-signal model (2) accurately
fits the correlation function data at time k; a large Jk indicates
the opposite, suggesting that multipath or spoofing interference
is present. This is illustrated in Fig. 1, where the top panel
illustrated a nominal scenario and the bottom panel represents
a spoofing scenario.
This distortion metric is more informative than the sym-
metric difference metric used in [6] because it (1) exploits
data from l taps, whereas the symmetric difference only uses
two, and (2) is insensitive to noise- or dynamics-induced
misalignment of the prompt tap (located at δi = 0) with
the authentic signal peak, whereas the symmetric difference
falsely reports distortion in this circumstance.
IV. DECISION RULE
Design of the PD-ML’s decision rule follows the same
procedure outlined in the PD detector [6], but with the new
-1 -0.5 0 0.5 1
 (chips)
-50
0
50
100
(
)
-1 -0.5 0 0.5 1
 (chips)
-20
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20
40
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)
Fig. 1: Multi-tap samples of the in-phase components of the
correlation function ξ(τ), the maximum-likelihood estimation
of ˆξ(τ) at the tap locations, and the difference between them
for a nominal scenario (top panel) and a spoofing scenario
(bottom panel). For readability, only the in-phase components
are shown. The norm of residuals between the measured and
estimated correlation function defines Jk, and is much larger
when the single-signal assumption is violated (e.g., spoofing
or multipath).
distortion metric replacing the symmetric difference. First, we
simulate the post-correlation model (1) using the same model
priors, parameter probability distributions, and probability
transition mechanisms for each hypothesis as in [6]. The
hypotheses are denoted Hi, i ∈ I for I = {0, 1, 2, 3}, where
the null hypothesis H0 corresponds to the interference-free
case, and Hi, i = 1, 2, 3 correspond respectively to multipath,
spoofing, and jamming. For each Monte-Carlo sample under
each hypothesis, a power measurement is made as in [6] and a
distortion measurement Dk = Jk is made as described above.
Fig. 2. shows the power-distortion measurements from a
Monte-Carlo simulation with l = 11 taps. One can observe
the following behavior of the new distortion metric Dk:
• Under H0 (interference-free): Dk is small, as only ther-
mal noise is present.
• Under H1 (multipath-afflicted): Dk is similar to that
of the H0 case when multipath is weak but attains a
significant magnitude as multipath severity increases.
• Under H2 (spoofing): Dk overlaps with that of multipath
(H1), but exhibits a much wider range.
• UnderH3 (jamming):Dk is nearly indistinguishable from
distortion under H0, as jamming has little effect on the
gain-controlled correlation function.
Based on the simulated data shown in Fig. 2, decision re-
gions corresponding to a Bayes-optimal decision rule for a
parameter-dependent cost C[i, θ] were found as described in
[6]. Fig. 3 shows the optimum decision regions Γi for i ∈ I.
Figs. 2 and 3 are analogous to Figs. 6 and 7 within [6].
When comparing these figures for PD and PD-ML, the most
notable difference being that the PD-ML’s distortion metric
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Fig. 2: Monte-Carlo-simulated distortion Dk and received
power Pk measurements for no interference (H0, green),
multipath (H1, black), spoofing (H2, red), and jamming (H3,
blue) based on a total of NP = 10
5 hypothesis samples and
NM = 20 independent simulated measurements per sample,
with l = 11 correlation taps contributing to the measurement
of Dk. As in [6], this simulation assumes a stealthy low-
power-advantage-spoofer, which explains why the red points
are clustered at low power relative to the blue (jamming)
points. Note that Dk is plotted on a logarithmic scale.
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0
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Fig. 3: Optimum decision regions for the θ-dependent cost
C[i, θ]: Γ0 (no interference, green), Γ1 (multipath, black), Γ2
(spoofing, red), and Γ3 (jamming, blue).
extends over a much larger domain than the PD detector
(i.e., notice the logarithmic scale in Figs. 2 and 3). This
increased distortion sensitivity could potentially lead to better
discrimination between jamming and spoofing and, likewise,
between interference free and multipath-afflicted.
Table I shows classification statistics as evaluated by apply-
ing the Bayes-optimal rule to a validation set of Monte-Carlo-
generated measurements that used the same assumptions as
the distributions shown in Fig. 2. This table reveals that the
PD-ML detector exhibits similar theoretical performance to
the PD detector. Both tend to misclassify multipath (H1) as
interference free (H0) because of the low cost assigned to this
error when multipath is mild. Otherwise, the PD-ML detector,
like the PD detector, exhibits high detection power and a low
false alarm rate.
TABLE I: Simulation-evaluated classification for the decision
regions in Fig. 3. The table’s (i, j)th element is the relative
frequency with which the detector chose i when j was the true
scenario.
Decision True Scenario
H0 H1 H2 H3
H0 0.9947 0.9083 0.0670 0.0039
H1 0 0.0698 0.0117 0
H2 0.0043 0.0214 0.8463 0.0155
H3 0.0010 0.0005 0.0750 0.9806
The sensitivity of the PD-ML detector’s performance to the
number of taps l was explored. Starting from l = 41 taps,
the entire design process was repeated for several choices
of l of decreasing value. Performance generally decreased
with reduced l. It was found that at least l = 11 taps were
needed to maintain a level of theoretical detector performance
comparable with that of the PD detector (Table I of [6]).
V. EXPERIMENTAL DATA
An independent evaluation of PD-ML was carried out
against 27 empirical GNSS data recordings, including 6
recordings of various spoofing scenarios [15], 14 multipath-
dense scenarios, 4 jamming scenarios of different power levels,
and 3 scenarios exhibiting negligible interference beyond
thermal and multi-access noise. The details of the data sets,
including their source, are given Table II of [6]. To ensure a
fair and direct comparison with the PD detector, these data
were pre-processed using the same approach as in [6].
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
This section presents the experimental performance assess-
ment of the PD-ML detector based on the decision regions
shown in Fig. 3 being applied to the observations, shown
in Fig. 4, derived from the 27 experimental data recordings.
Table II summarizes the PD-ML detector’s overall perfor-
mance against the experimental data in terms of classification
statistics.
TABLE II: As Table I, but for the detector applied to the
experimental recordings (sans tb7).
Decision True Scenario
H0 H1 H2 H3
H0 0.8500 0.4337 0.0001 0
H1 0.1500 0.5632 0 0
H2 0 0.0031 0.8289 0.2176
H3 0 0 0.1676 0.7824
When comparing this table to the corresponding one for
the PD detector (Table III in [6]), the important result is that
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Fig. 4: Empirical distortion Dk and received power Pk
measurements for interference-free (green), multipath (black),
spoofing (red), and jamming (blue) from the 27 experimental
recordings.
classification performance accuracy under a spoofing attack is
improved more than four-fold. That is, with the PD detector,
spoofing attacks were classified as jamming for 82% of
experimental spoofing detection trials. This is reduced to only
17% with the PD-ML detector. All but 0.01% of spoofing or
jamming attacks result in an alarm. Compared to the PD-ML
detector, there is nearly a two-fold decrease in spoofing false
alarms under H1 (multipath). Finally, the PD-ML detector
correctly classifies 56% of the multipath data, compared to
only 12% with the PD detector.
Thus, although the PD-ML detector does not enjoy any
significant advantage over the PD detector when tested against
Monte-Carlo-simulated data (Table I), it significantly out-
performs the PD detector when tested against the empirical
dataset. A likely explanation is that the PD-ML detector’s
greater number of correlation taps (for Table II, l = 11) allow
spoofer-induced distortion to be readily detected over a wider
range of spoofer-to-authentic code phase offset.
The PD-ML detector was also applied to the especially
stealthy tb7 attack [16], which mounts a nulling attack during
the beginning of the attack before pull-off. This attack would
be extremely difficulty to realize outside the laboratory. Soon
after pull-off begins, the PD-ML detector correctly classifies
the attack as spoofing. Against the attack portion of the
scenario, its decision rates were H0: 17%,H1: 17%,H2: 66%,
and H3: 0%, as compared to H0: 14%, H1: 10%, H2: 70%,
and H3: 6% for the PD detector. The PD-ML detector’s attack
detection power is 10% lower than the PD detector’s on this
attack, but it never mis-attributes spoofing as jamming. This
can be attributed to especially subtle nature of this attack.
In particular, a larger portion of the period prior to pull-off
is labeled as multipath by the PD-ML detector due to the
authentic signal being nulled.
The PD-ML detector’s superior spoofing vs. jamming clas-
sification is further illustrated in of Fig. 5, which shows
the single-channel cumulative time history of the detector’s
decisions for example jamming and spoofing attack scenarios
using both the proposed PD-ML detector and the original PD
detector. Within Fig. 5, 5b shows the reproduced Fig. 10 from
[6] and illustrates the performance of the PD detector. In Fig.
5a, detection is assessed against the same attack scenarios
using the proposed PD-ML detector. Like the PD detector,
in the jamming scenario (top panels), the attack is detected
immediately at its onset, and continuously declared thereafter.
In the spoofing scenario (bottom panels), the attack is detected
immediately, and briefly classified as jamming because the
spoofer’s near-perfect initial code-phase alignment causes little
distortion (and, indeed, little harm to the receiver). However,
as the spoofer begins its pull-off, the PD-ML detector correctly
declares the attack to be spoofing and does so for the remainder
of the attack. This is different from the PD detector in Fig.
5b , which declares the attack as an almost equal blend of
jamming and spoofing as the pull-off proceeds.
Finally, when comparing the PD-ML detector to the PD
detector is it important to point out that the PD-ML detector’s
distortion metric requires more computational complexity. In
particular, the PD detector’s distortion metric simply subtracts
two taps to determine symmetric difference [6]. In contrast, the
PD-ML detector requires a Maximum-Likelihood estimation
of the correlation function and requires access to multiple tap
data. Further, this estimator is executed multiple times. First
over a coarse search for the code-phase and then during a
refinement stage via bisection. As such, one should consider
complexity against performance when deciding to the chose
the PD-ML detector or the PD detector.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper presented the PD-ML detector, an extension
to the recently-proposed PD detector. The PD-ML detector
employs a maximum-likelihood multipath estimator and uses
the magnitude of its post-fit residuals to monitor distortion, as
opposed to the PD detector’s use of a symmetric difference.
Like the PD detector, the PD-ML detector traps a would-be
attacker between simultaneous monitoring of received power
and complex correlation function distortion. In a head-to-head
evaluation based on 27 high-quality experimental recordings
of attack and non-attack scenarios, the PD-ML detector was
shown to be significantly better at classifying spoofing vs. jam-
ming, exhibiting a nearly four-fold improvement. In addition,
the PD-ML detector was shown to significantly improve the
classification of multipath data. The improved performance
improvement comes at the expense of the additional com-
putational complexity associated with producing correlation
products from a larger number of taps and processing these
with a maximum-likelihood estimator. Thus, depending on the
application, the simpler PD detector may be more favorable
despite the better classification performance offered by the PD-
ML detector. In future work, it will be important to evaluate
the the sensitivity of both the PD-ML and PD detectors on
receiver’s with a narrower front-end bandwidth (i.e., 2 MHz).
The code for the PD-ML detector has been made
available at the same repository as the PD detector:
https://github.com/navSecurity/P-D-defense [17].
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(a) Detection conducted with the proposed PD-ML detector.
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(b) Detection conducted with PD detector. This figure has been
reproduced from [6] (Fig. 10) to allow for a side-by-side comparison.
Fig. 5: Cumulative time history of decisions for a single receiver tracking channel. Each trace represents the total number of
times the corresponding hypothesis was chosen up to time tk, normalized so that the final cumulative values sum to one. Both
attacks begin at 120 seconds. Top: Jamming scenario jd3. Bottom: Spoofing scenario tb4 with the detectors applied to a
mid-elevation satellite signal.
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